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How to Conduct Effective Transnational Negotiations 
between Nations, Nongovernmental Organizations, 
and Business Firms 
Charles B. Craver

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As computers, the Internet, and efficient transportation systems 
have generated a truly global political and economic world,
1
 the 
extent of governmental and private transnational negotiating has 
significantly increased. International political entities—such as the 
United Nations and its affiliates and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO)—and regional political/economic groups—such as the 
European Union, the Group of Eight (G-8), the expanded Group of 
Twenty (G-20), and the North American Free Trade Zone—have 
increased the number of bilateral and multilateral governmental 
bargaining interactions. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
have become increasingly involved with issues that were previously 
addressed exclusively through governmental channels. The 
simultaneous growth of multinational business firms has similarly 
increased the frequency of private transnational business 
negotiations.  
National and transnational bargaining interactions have many 
similarities—and certain critical differences.2 They tend to involve 
 
  Freda H. Alverson Professor, George Washington University Law School. J.D. 
(1971), University of Michigan; Master of Industrial and Labor Relations (1968), Cornell 
University School of Industrial and Labor Relations; B.S. (1967), Cornell University. The 
author wishes to thank the participants of the Washington University Scholarship Roundtable 
on “New Directions in Global Dispute Resolution” for their insightful and beneficial comments 
on an earlier draft of this Article.  
 1. See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005). 
 2. See generally VIKTOR K. KREMENYUK, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: ANALYSIS, 
APPROACHES, ISSUES 3 (2d ed. 2002); DONALD W. HENDON, REBECCA A. HENDON & PAUL 
HERBIG, CROSS-CULTURAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS 9–13 (1996). 
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the same negotiation stages and many common bargaining 
techniques, even though identical tactics may be given different 
names in different countries. Due to cultural differences, the 
negotiation stages may take longer to develop during transnational 
interactions, and certain tactics may be more or less acceptable to the 
different participants involved. 
Governmental representatives are significantly affected by 
stereotypical beliefs regarding their political and economic systems 
and their national cultures—as well as those of the national groups 
with which they are interacting. They must be aware of the political 
constraints under which they frequently operate and, in some 
instances, of military and security considerations. Private business 
negotiators are similarly affected by cultural stereotyping. They may 
also be influenced by the need for governmental involvement in what 
may seem to be entirely private business transactions. 
Verbal and nonverbal communication is an indispensable part of 
transnational interactions, but written and spoken exchanges may be 
subject to interpretive difficulties—even when the parties think they 
are speaking an identical language (e.g., United States, British, 
Canadian, and Australian negotiators). Similar nonverbal behavior 
may have different meanings in different cultures. Even though a 
distinct international bargaining culture may have developed among 
governmental and corporate representatives who regularly interact 
with others in European, North and South American, African, and 
Asian countries, it is rare for most individuals to escape entirely the 
impact of the cultures in which they were raised and in which they 
presently reside.
3
 
This Article will explore the different types of governmental and 
business transnational negotiations. Part II will focus on official inter-
government discussions. Part III will discuss the involvement of 
seemingly private citizens in governmental interactions, and Part IV 
will cover transnational business negotiations. Part V will consider 
the impact of cultural differences on transnational dealings between 
governments and private business entities. Part VI will focus on the 
way governmental and business firm negotiators must prepare for 
 
 3. See MICHAEL WATKINS & SUSAN ROSEGRANT, BREAKTHROUGH IN INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATION 73–79 (2001). 
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such bargaining encounters. Part VII will talk about how parties 
should initiate transnational interactions through what is called the 
Preliminary Stage.
4
 Part VIII will cover value creation during the 
Information Stage.
5
 Part IX will explore value claiming during the 
Distributive and Closing Stages.
6
 Part X will emphasize the need for 
value maximizing during the Cooperative Stage.
7
 And finally, Part XI 
will explore cell phone and e-mail interactions. 
II. OFFICIAL INTER-GOVERNMENT DIPLOMACY 
When countries directly negotiate with one another—“Track I 
Diplomacy” (“Track I”)—their discussions may be carried out 
through formal channels or through informal “back channel” 
communications.
8
 Formal channels are usually employed for 
conventional interactions, while back channels are used for 
particularly delicate talks or when the pertinent governments do not 
have direct diplomatic relations.
9
 The least complicated inter-nation 
negotiations involve bilateral interactions between two nations (e.g., 
United States–Mexico; France–Germany; Japan–China). Multilateral 
talks may include three or four countries or a hundred or more 
nations. They may be conducted on an ad hoc basis involving various 
countries with common interests, or through formal organizations 
such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or the 
European Union. 
 
 4. The Preliminary Stage is the first part of the interaction with persons on the other side, 
during which the participants endeavor to establish rapport and the tone for their interaction. 
See generally Charles B. Craver, The Negotiation Process, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOCACY 271 
(2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=987654. 
 5. “During the Information Stage, negotiators ask open-ended questions designed to 
discover what items are available for division.” Id.  
 6. “During the Distributive Stage, the participants vie for the items that are on the 
table—value claiming. During the Closing Stage, the parties seek to solidify the terms of their 
agreement without giving up more than they need to.” Id. 
 7. “During the final Cooperative Stage, the participants should work to maximize their 
joint returns to be certain they have achieved mutually efficient agreements.” Id. 
 8. See generally Anthony Wanis-St. John, Back-Channel Negotiation: International 
Bargaining in the Shadows, 22 NEGOT. J. 119 (2006).  
 9. See RICHARD H. SOLOMON & NIGEL QUINNEY, AMERICAN NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR 
94–96 (2012). 
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Bilateral negotiations are usually conducted under ad hoc 
procedures established by the direct participants reflecting the 
specific discussions involved. These interactions may concern 
economic, political, cultural, humanitarian, or military issues. For 
example, governments may be exploring trade limitations, 
immigration policies, human rights issues, or regional or global arms 
limitations. These interactions may involve participants with 
relatively equal or wholly disparate economic or military power. 
Bilateral accords usually require only the approval of the 
governments directly involved before they become operative. When 
executive accords are at issue, only the approval of the president or 
prime minister may be required, while treaties usually require 
legislative ratification.
10
 Presidents who are concerned about divisive 
senate debate over politically sensitive bilateral pacts frequently 
resort to executive agreements that do not necessitate senate 
approval. 
Bilateral agreements generally do not require the approval of other 
nations before they become effective. In some instances, however, 
existing treaty obligations may necessitate the consent of trading 
partners before bilateral trade agreements with other countries can 
become operative. Bilateral security deals may initially have to be 
approved by regional groups, such as the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) or the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), before they can become operative. Bilateral economic 
agreements may have to be approved by entities, such as the 
European Union or the North American Free Trade group. Even 
when the approval of other countries is not required, newly 
negotiated bilateral arrangements may directly affect the rights of 
other nations. For example, countries with “most favored nation” 
(MFN) trading deals may be able to take advantage of more generous 
terms given to other nations.
11
 
Multi-nation interactions are normally more complex than 
bilateral talks. They tend to involve multiple issues and numerous 
 
 10. Executive accords are between heads of state, while treaties are between nations. 
 11. See Gilbert R. Winham, Simulation for Teaching and Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL 
NEGOTIATION 465, 472–73 (Victor A. Kremenyuk ed., 2002) (discussing the potential impact 
of MFN clauses on different tariffs). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/9
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parties. It is frequently difficult to know initially which participants 
will support or oppose the different issues. When many nations are 
involved, the discussions are usually carried out through existing 
international organizations, such as the U.N. or the E.U. These 
interactions tend to have formal agendas and specific approval 
procedures. Some agreements only have to be approved by the 
sponsoring entity to become operative, while other accords must be 
approved by all, or a substantial number, of the participants before 
they take effect. In some cases, domestic legislation must be enacted 
to effectuate the policies set forth in non-binding international 
agreements. 
Throughout most of the twentieth century, multilateral discussions 
tended to be dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Less powerful countries often felt ignored. Since the fall of the Soviet 
Union, many emerging countries have begun to appreciate the 
increased bargaining power they can generate through formal or 
informal voting blocks.
12
 Nations with common interests endeavor to 
align themselves in ways they hope will maximize their bargaining 
influence. Whenever possible, they strive to generate voting rules that 
treat large and small nations equally. Such rules are generally in place 
with respect to talks involving established entities like the United 
Nations. Nonetheless, when multilateral negotiations are conducted 
on an ad hoc basis, the rules are likely to be significantly influenced 
by economically and/or militarily powerful countries that adopt 
weighted voting procedures that diminish the capability of weaker 
nations to defeat overall accords. 
Individuals who represent nations in the international arena must 
appreciate that they are always acting in an official capacity. No 
matter how much they may seek to develop individual identities, they 
continue to be viewed by others as spokespersons for their specific 
countries. This is true whether they are communicating through 
formal or informal channels. As a result, U.S. spokespersons tend to 
be burdened with the stereotypical baggage associated with U.S. 
representatives. They are likely to be perceived as arrogant, powerful, 
uncompromising, unsympathetic, and capitalistic. American agents 
 
 12. See WATKINS & ROSEGRANT, supra note 3, at 213–15. 
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who attempt to dispel these images by disassociating themselves 
from official U.S. positions may create different problems. Others 
would be shocked that American agents might undermine the 
interests of their own country, and would be hesitant to trust such 
disloyal persons. It thus behooves U.S. representatives to consistently 
behave in a manner that enhances the underlying interests of their 
own country. 
When meaningful inter-government negotiations are involved, 
U.S. agents usually have severely circumscribed bargaining authority. 
They are generally required to confer regularly with the State 
Department and/or the Defense Department, the White House, the 
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, and other entities that have some 
control over the final terms agreed upon. Their interactions are 
orchestrated by these entities, which severely restricts their capacity 
to do anything spontaneously.
13
  
Since bilateral and multilateral negotiations usually concern issues 
of importance to different government agencies, it is critical for the 
relevant parties to engage in thorough intra-government planning 
prior to the external discussions.
14
 To guarantee the development of 
common objectives, all interested parties must be asked about their 
respective interests. To generate the projection of unified national 
positions, bargaining strategy must be addressed. How should the 
designated negotiators move from where they commence their 
discussions to where they are expected to end up? If these planning 
activities are not carried out properly, negative consequences are 
likely to result. Agents from other nations who sense the lack of a 
unified approach may try to exploit internal disagreements. In 
addition, if the final terms agreed upon do not satisfy the needs of the 
relevant U.S. agencies, dissatisfied officials may endeavor to 
undermine the accord. They may contact White House, State 
Department, Defense Department, or Senate officials in an effort to 
compel the renegotiation of the disfavored provisions. Thus, 
 
 13. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal 
Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 392–93 (2000) (indicating the United States 
would not approve the rules applicable to the newly created International Criminal Court, since 
the rules do not comport completely with U.S. interests). 
 14. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR 33–35 (2003) [hereinafter 
SALACUSE, GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/9
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American negotiators must realize that their intra-government 
discussions may be more contentious and protracted than their 
subsequent inter-government bargaining sessions. Persons who seek 
to avoid this crucial step during their preparation phase usually 
encounter more difficulties in the long run than individuals who have 
engaged in careful intra-organizational preparation. 
When expansive international conferences are involved, multi-
person delegations may be required. When these delegations interact 
with delegates from other countries, U.S. agents must seek to 
discover which persons possess real influence with their home 
governments, which ones are destabilizing participants who may try 
to hinder progress, and which ones are mediators who will endeavor 
to accommodate the competing interests involved. They have to think 
of the means they can employ to induce the mediative agents to 
neutralize the destabilizers in a manner that enables the influential 
agents to agree to the desired goals. 
Inter-nation negotiations at regional or global conferences 
frequently take place at various levels. Preconference discussions 
between and among the key participants are used to define the issues 
to be addressed and to determine the conference procedures that must 
be followed. Once the conference begins, plenary sessions are used 
for formal speeches and public debate. Smaller working groups are 
usually created to explore the specific topics and to formulate 
proposals that will ultimately be considered by the entire conference. 
When such multi-nation talks do not progress well, the participants 
may request the assistance of neutral intervenors. Intervenors may be 
chosen because of their formal position (e.g., Secretary General of 
the United Nations) or because they are experts from nonaligned 
countries. Skilled negotiators from NGOs may also be asked to 
interact with persons from similar entities in other nations, to help set 
the stage for subsequent inter-nation interactions. Such persons can 
assist the conference participants to reopen clogged communication 
channels, to get the disputing parties to explore their diverse 
underlying interests, and to search for alternatives that may 
simultaneously satisfy the needs of everyone. 
When conflicted states distrust one another because of previous 
violations of trust, it may help to employ “confidence building” 
measures that induce the parties to move in small reciprocal 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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increments until they can restore the mutual trust needed to enable 
them to move toward final accords.
15
 During such confidence-
building stages, each side agrees to take alternating steps toward an 
overall resolution that will ultimately culminate in mutually 
acceptable terms. Once a number of such mutual steps have been 
taken, and bargaining credibility has been restored, the participants 
may be able to make the overarching commitments needed to resolve 
the underlying conflicts.
16
 
III. PRIVATE CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN GOVERNMENTAL 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Some international conflicts may not respond favorably to 
exchanges through formal diplomatic channels. The disputants may 
not trust the governments that are trying to help. To circumvent such 
difficulties, NGOs have increasingly become involved. For many 
years, groups affiliated with the Quaker Church (e.g., American 
Friends Service Committee) have worked in numerous areas to 
promote human rights and world peace. In recent years, NGOs like 
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers 
Committee for Human Rights, the Institute for Multi-Track 
Diplomacy, and the Carter Peace Institute have provided dispute 
resolution assistance in areas like Northern Ireland, Cyprus, the 
Middle East, South Africa, and Rwanda.
17
 Such NGOs often work for 
several years with NGOs from other countries, to set the stage for 
subsequent nation-to-nation or multi-nation negotiations. 
The involvement of NGOs and private citizens in international 
conflicts has been labeled “Track II Diplomacy.”18 Such private 
entities are not constrained by political considerations affecting 
official government institutions. Unlike State Department officials 
who must always speak for their government, NGOs and private 
citizens can speak as individuals. They can behave in ways that 
 
 15. See WATKINS & ROSEGRANT, supra note 3, at 167, 270. 
 16. See, e.g., URI SAVIR, THE PROCESS (1998) (describing the various steps taken by 
Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization as they worked toward the Oslo Accords).  
 17. See Sadat & Carden, supra note 13, at 386 n.19. 
 18. See JOHN W. MCDONALD, JR. & DIANE B. BENDAHMANE, CONFLICT RESOLUTION: 
TRACK II DIPLOMACY 1 (1987). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/9
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would be unacceptable for government spokespersons. They do not 
have to worry about the political consequences of their actions back 
home. 
Groups and individuals engaged in Track II Diplomacy (“Track 
II”) frequently interact with similar organizations in the host nations. 
They may have to use this approach because of the unwillingness of 
government officials to recognize their mediative status. They may 
create cultural or athletic exchanges that allow persons from the 
disputing nations to get to know each other in mutually beneficial 
settings. Once beneficial relationships are established, they can begin 
to address the critical issues affecting them, and government officials 
may become involved in the formal discussions.  
Despite their freedom from government control, NGO 
representatives are still subject to cultural stereotyping that can 
influence the way they are perceived. When American citizens travel 
abroad, it is almost impossible for them to entirely shed their U.S. 
images. This fact makes it difficult for them to intervene in 
controversies that meaningfully concern American interests. The 
disputing parties may find it impossible for such persons to 
completely ignore the policies of their home government. To 
circumvent such difficulties, the assistance of private citizens from 
nonaligned countries may be requested. It is often easier for 
individuals from such neutral states to earn the trust and respect of 
the disputing parties. 
Experienced Track II negotiators can often affect inter-nation 
controversies, such as those between Greece and Cyprus, Rwanda 
and Burundi, and Israel and Syria. In such areas, they may work in 
parallel with Track I diplomats from their home countries. Although 
it might be awkward for foreign governments to become involved 
with the internal affairs of other nations, private organizations do not 
have to worry about this issue. As a result, agents from such entities 
can frequently meet privately with government officials from the 
target countries, who do not view such discussions as infringements 
on their national sovereignty.  
Track II diplomatic efforts are normally carried out in stages. The 
preliminary step involves the establishment of personal contacts with 
people or organizations in the target nations. The neutral intervenors 
work to get leaders from the selected groups to get to know each 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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other in nonthreatening situations. Once they have developed a 
minimal level of inter-group trust, the intervenors often create 
problem-solving workshops that include respected persons from the 
disputing countries. Cultural differences are explored in an effort to 
generate mutual respect for the diverse backgrounds involved. When 
the individuals from the disputing nations begin to feel comfortable 
with each other, the conciliators start to explore the underlying causes 
of the conflict involved and search for solutions that might be 
mutually acceptable. 
Joint brainstorming meetings can be employed to induce the 
disputing parties to begin to work together toward the achievement of 
common goals. The conciliators often try to get persons from the 
different nations to place themselves in the shoes of people from the 
other side, to help them appreciate their perspectives. Once the 
participants begin to develop possible ways to resolve their 
differences, these private citizens are encouraged to reach out to their 
fellow citizens through televised discussions or at public forums. 
Written materials may also be created and disseminated among the 
interested parties. This educational approach is especially effective 
with respect to younger people, who may not recall past wrongs as 
strongly as the people who lived through them. Once public opinion 
begins to support the resolution efforts generated through this 
process, government officials begin to feel pressure to move in the 
same direction. The private groups have set the stage for formal 
government involvement in the talks dealing with the underlying 
issues. 
Persons who endeavor to engage in Track II diplomatic efforts 
must be extremely patient. Most inter-cultural conflicts have taken 
years to develop, and the disputing parties are unlikely to alter their 
perspectives quickly. Conciliators who try to rush the healing process 
are likely to generate further distrust and undermine the settlement 
efforts. They must begin with minimal objectives and work slowly 
but steadily toward final resolutions. 
IV. TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS  
As the economy has become global in scope, corporate 
representatives have had to become more proficient transnational 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/9
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negotiators. Creation of the North American Free Trade Zone has 
expanded purchase and sales talks between United States firms and 
Canadian and Mexican businesses. As the European Union has 
expanded, American corporations have had to negotiate with EU 
companies. U.S. firms are increasingly purchasing goods and services 
from lower wage businesses in South America, Africa, and Asia, and 
they are endeavoring to sell more to parties in those expanding 
nations. 
Transnational business negotiations are often more complex than 
interactions within one’s own country. Greater distances between 
bargaining parties frequently necessitate time-consuming travel to 
foreign nations. Many negotiators feel most comfortable bargaining 
on their own turf.
19
 Individuals who travel significant distances to 
other countries may experience serious jet lag, and fear that their 
presence in the other company’s territory may be perceived as an 
indication of their eagerness to generate agreements. They may feel 
they have to achieve accords before they return home. This is why it 
is important for them to arrive a day or two before the substantive 
discussions are scheduled to commence, and they should be 
somewhat flexible with respect to when they have to return home. 
Bargainers who visit foreign countries face other difficulties. They 
will be away from their families and colleagues for extended periods, 
and may have to adjust to unfamiliar foods. They have to deal with 
different cultures and embarrassment when they commit a faux pas. 
They have to accept hospitality from their hosts, which may create 
feelings of obligation on their part, and cause them to make excessive 
concessions. To counteract such feelings, they should provide their 
hosts with reciprocal hospitality by taking them to nice restaurants 
and providing them with appropriate gifts. 
Transnational business negotiations are generally more protracted 
than domestic interactions, due to cultural differences and the greater 
complexity of the issues being addressed.
20
 It can be beneficial to 
divide the discussions into discrete stages. During the pre-negotiation 
 
 19. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Your Place or Mine: Deciding Where to Negotiate, 8 
NEGOT. MAG. 7, 3 (Apr. 2005). 
 20. See FRANK L. ACUFF, HOW TO NEGOTIATE ANYTHING WITH ANYONE ANYWHERE 
AROUND THE WORLD 77–79 (1997). 
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phase, each side should try to determine whether their contemplated 
talks are likely to be mutually beneficial. If circumstances seem to be 
propitious, they can use the pre-negotiation phase to create a formal 
agenda for their impending discussions. Once this stage is finished, 
they can address the specific details of their joint venture. 
V. IMPACT OF CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND NEGOTIATOR STYLES 
ON INTER-NATION AND TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS INTERACTIONS 
Culture consists of such social phenomena as personal beliefs, 
ideas, languages, customs, rules, and family patterns.
21
 These factors 
provide each society with a set of shared values and beliefs that 
define the way individuals envision themselves and their social 
groups. Culture influences the manner in which group members 
interact with each other, and the way in which individuals from 
different cultures relate to one another. These considerations are 
highly relevant for transnational negotiators, since the behavior of the 
participants is likely to vary significantly depending on their 
respective cultural backgrounds.
22
 Professional cultures also affect 
multi-country interactions, as diplomats, lawyers, and 
businesspersons apply different approaches to address similar 
circumstances.
23
 
When Americans bargain with other Americans, they assume 
similar cultural rules, even when the other parties are from different 
geographic areas. Verbal expressions and nonverbal signals tend to 
have common meanings, and the participants are likely to share 
common values. On the other hand, when Americans bargain with 
persons from foreign nations, they have to acknowledge the influence 
 
 21. See Julia A. Gold, ADR through a Cultural Lens: How Cultural Values Shape Our 
Disputing Processes, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 289, 292–302 (2005); Ilhyung Lee, In Re Culture: The 
Cross-Cultural Negotiations Course in the Law School Curriculum, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 375, 393–401 (2005); NANCY J. ADLER, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 16–24 (4th ed. 2002). 
 22. See TONY ENGLISH, TUG OF WAR: THE TENSION CONCEPT AND THE ART OF 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 95–98 (2010); SALACUSE, GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR, supra note 
14, at 89–115. 
 23. See generally GUNNAR SJOSTEDT, PROFESSIONAL CULTURES IN NEGOTIATION (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/9
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of cultural differences.
24
 Positive and negative stereotypes may affect 
their encounters. Traits may be attributed to participants based on 
their cultural backgrounds that have no relationship to reality. This 
could undermine their substantive talks. 
Individuals who are planning to conduct negotiations with persons 
from other countries should initially work to obtain information 
regarding the national cultures involved.
25
 When people study the 
cultural backgrounds of foreign opponents, they must be careful not 
to assume that all persons from a particular nation think and behave 
alike.
26
 They only have to consider the different personalities of 
persons from their own geographic region to realize how diverse 
individuals are within the same country. Nonetheless, when they 
initially encounter persons from different cultures, it may be helpful 
to consider the behavioral generalities attributed to people from their 
particular cultures. This should provide them with a good place to 
begin their evaluation of their individual counterparts, and it should 
help them avoid cultural taboos that could negatively affect their 
interactions. 
Professor William Zartman has suggested that national cultural 
differences have become less significant over the past few decades, 
due to the development of an international negotiation culture that is 
an amalgam of the styles of major industrial nations.
27
 Although it is 
certainly true that State Department officials who represent their 
respective governments in the international arena and persons who 
repeatedly negotiate private transnational business arrangements have 
all been influenced by an international bargaining culture, it is 
difficult for most persons to entirely shed the subtle, and even overt, 
 
 24. See, e.g., JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY 203 (2001); HENDON, 
HENDON & HERBIG, supra note 2, at 43–76. 
 25. Two excellent starting points for a negotiator seeking to acquaint herself with another 
culture are OLEGARIO LLAMAZARES, HOW TO NEGOTIATE SUCCESSFULLY IN 50 COUNTRIES 
(2008) and TERRI MORRISON & WAYNE A. CONAWAY, KISS, BOW, OR SHAKE HANDS (2006) 
(discussing the bargaining cultures of over sixty countries). 
 26. See LOTHAR KATZ, PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 9–10 
(2008); see also James Sebenius, Caveats for Cross-Border Negotiators, 18 NEGOT. J. 121, 
122–26 (2002).  
 27. See I. William Zartman, A Skeptic’s View, in CULTURE AND NEGOTIATION 17, 19 
(Guy Oliver Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1993).  
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influences of their own cultures.
28
 Our basic beliefs, customs, value 
systems, and verbal and nonverbal interpretations continue to be 
affected by our formative environments and our current 
surroundings.
29
 Our cultural backgrounds affect whether we think we 
can control our destinies or believe they have been predetermined. 
Our cultures determine whether we endeavor to resolve problems 
deductively, inductively, or in some other manner. 
Punctuality is more important to Americans than it is to persons 
from some other cultures.
30
 It is generally rude for an American to 
show up for a business meeting five or ten minutes past the scheduled 
time, while a thirty or forty-five minute delay would not be 
uncommon in Latin American or Middle Eastern countries.
31
 While 
Americans tend to separate business and social discussions, 
counterparts from other nations feel completely comfortable 
conducting business transactions during social functions.
32
 
In many Middle Eastern countries, it is considered extremely rude 
to display the bottom of one’s foot. Individuals conducting business 
in such areas should be careful not to cross their legs in a manner that 
displays the soles of their shoes. In some Asian nations, it is 
disrespectful for persons to talk to someone with one or both hands in 
their pocket.
33
 When Americans interact with people from such 
cultures, they should be careful to keep both hands out of their 
pockets. 
In Asian countries like Japan, South Korea, and China, 
businesspersons consider the exchange of business cards to be formal 
endeavors. They usually have their names and professional 
information in their own language on one side and in English on the 
opposite side. When they hand someone a card, that person is 
 
 28. See WATKINS & ROSEGRANT, supra note 3. 
 29. See Jeanne M. Brett & Michele J. Gelfand, A Cultural Analysis of the Underlying 
Assumptions of Negotiation Theory, in NEGOTIATION THEORY AND RESEARCH 173, 175 (Leigh 
Thompson ed., 2006). 
 30. See MICHELLE LE BARON, BRIDGING CULTURAL CONFLICTS 42 (2003); see also 
EDWARD T. HALL, THE SILENT LANGUAGE 158–61 (1973). 
 31. See, e.g., LLAMAZARES, supra note 25, at 10, 141 (discussing Argentina and Panama). 
 32. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 21, at 226 (advising American negotiators to buck their 
impulse to engage in strictly task-related discussion with international counterparts, and instead 
to view lunches, dinners, receptions, etc. as opportunities to continue the negotiating process).  
 33. See LLAMAZARES, supra note 25, at 112 (Japan). 
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expected to hold the card with both hands as they take time to 
examine both sides. They should then place the card in a prominent 
place, and never simply deposit it in their pocket or brief case.  
The United States has a relatively informal culture, and 
Americans do not hesitate to establish a first-name relationship with 
strangers rather quickly. In most European and Asian countries, this 
is considered improper. Adults, especially older persons, prefer to be 
addressed by their last names and formal titles. Although many 
younger persons from these nations are more willing to establish 
first-name relationships, it is good for individuals to wait until they 
are asked several times to address them by their first names before 
they use this approach. When addressing young professional women, 
it is usually preferable to use señora or frau, instead of the diminutive 
señorita or fräulein, because no male equivalent exists, and the use of 
such diminutive female terms may be considered sexist. 
Spatial and conversational distances vary greatly among persons 
from different cultures.
34
 In America, it is expected that people who 
do not know each other extremely well stand about two feet apart 
during formal business talks. In other cultures, such as Middle 
Eastern countries, eight- to twelve-inch spatial distances are common. 
The more expansive spatial distances employed by most Americans 
may cause those persons to be viewed as cold or disinterested by 
individuals from closer cultures. When people from countries with 
quite different spatial differences get together, it can be helpful for 
them to take seats quickly, to diminish the impact of this factor. 
Cultures like the United States and England are highly 
individualistic.
35
 Persons from such countries value individual 
independence over group cohesiveness. Firms reward individuals 
who use autonomous behavior to advance their own self-interests. 
Societal status is primarily based on individual, rather than group, 
accomplishments. Private firm managers—unlike their government 
counterparts—usually possess the authority to make crucial decisions 
on their own. People from such cultures like to negotiate because it 
provides them the opportunity to demonstrate their individual skills. 
 
 34. See HALL, supra note 30, at 162–85. 
 35. See TAN JOO SENG & ELIZABETH NGAH KIING LIM, STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE 
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When agreements are achieved, they know they will be carried out, 
because they possess the authority to bind their firms. 
Other cultures, such as Japan and China, have a collectivistic 
orientation.
36
 Persons in these countries are defined more by their 
national, family, and business connections than by their individual 
endeavors. They are assessed more by the achievements of their 
countries or organizations than by their own accomplishments. 
Individuals work together to advance group interests. Mangers have 
to consult with others when important decisions must be made, with 
most final determinations made through a consensus process. 
Individuals from collectivistic cultures often dislike bargaining 
encounters, because they prefer to avoid conflicts and dislike the loss 
of face often associated with the give-and-take of the negotiation 
process.
37
 Persons from individualistic cultures tend to have shorter 
time frames than people from collectivistic cultures, because 
individualists wish to reap the benefits of their accomplishments 
expeditiously.  
Sociologists distinguish between “high-context” and “low-
context” cultures.38 High-context cultures tend to be group-oriented. 
They value the establishment and preservation of long-term 
relationships and the respect for group norms. They employ face-
saving mechanisms to avoid embarrassing overt capitulations.
39
 They 
do not like auction bargaining, where the parties begin a distance 
apart and slowly move toward the center of their opening positions, 
because of the repeated concessions associated with that process. 
They communicate more indirectly, to avoid placing others in 
awkward positions. You usually have to consider the setting to 
understand the actual meaning of what is being stated.
40
 When they 
say something might be possible, it suggests it is doubtful. When they 
say something might be difficult, it almost always means “no.” They 
often accept ambiguous contractual language designed to please both 
sides and avoid the appearance of loss by either party. They are 
 
 36. See id.; Gold, supra note 21, at 296–97. 
 37. See SENG & LIM, supra note 35, at 34–35. 
 38. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REQUEJO & JOHN L. GRAHAM, GLOBAL NEGOTIATION 57–59 
(2008); SENG & LIM, supra note 35, at 30–32. 
 39. See, e.g., RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CULTURES 56–61 (1991). 
 40. See KATZ, supra note 26, at 51–54. 
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usually patient negotiators who prefer to become well acquainted 
with opponents before they seek to resolve the substantive issues. 
Low-context cultures tend to be individualistic and goal-oriented. 
Low-context negotiators are primarily interested in the attainment of 
beneficial and legally enforceable agreements, even when they do not 
particularly like the persons on the other side. They feel comfortable 
with the give-and-take of auction bargaining, believing compromise 
leads to common ground. They prefer direct communication that 
indicates exactly what they mean. They do not hesitate to say “no” 
when they are not willing to give in to an opponent’s request. They 
are rule-oriented individuals who hope to obtain accords that 
explicitly define all of the relevant terms. They believe ambiguous 
language will only generate future interpretive difficulties. 
Individuals feel most comfortable when they interact with persons 
from same-context cultures. When people from low-context cultures 
interact with others from high-context cultures, cross-cultural 
conflicts may arise.
41
 The high-context participants may feel that 
their low-context opponents are being too direct, while the low-
context persons may think their opponents are unwilling to directly 
address the real issues that must be resolved. The low-context 
negotiators cannot understand why the opposing parties are hesitant 
to match their concessions, while the high-context participants cannot 
comprehend why their opponents wish to openly embarrass them. If 
such participants are unable to accommodate each other’s cultural 
needs, the likelihood of an agreement will be small. 
It is usually more difficult to achieve mutually efficient accords 
during inter-cultural interactions than during intra-cultural 
encounters. Nonetheless, negotiators from different cultures can 
enhance their joint gains if certain common values are present: first, it 
helps if they share a belief in the value of information-sharing, to 
enable the parties to appreciate each other’s needs and interests; 
second, the ability to deal with multiple issues simultaneously, to 
permit the participants to generate mutually beneficial trades; third, a 
desire to improve on any tentative agreement, to allow the parties to 
continue to explore possible ways they might generate additional 
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joint gains. Cultures that do not share these beliefs are less likely to 
generate efficient agreements. 
Is it more effective to be a win-win Cooperative/Problem-Solving 
negotiator, who desires to work with opponents to generate mutually 
beneficial agreements, or a win-lose Competitive/Adversarial 
negotiator, who is primarily interested in obtaining terms favoring her 
own side? Studies conducted by Professors Gerald Williams
42
 and 
Andrea Kupfer Schneider
43
 found that far more 
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers are considered effective negotiators 
than Competitive/Adversarials, while far more 
Competitive/Adversarials are considered ineffective negotiators than 
Cooperative/Problem-Solvers. This is because you do get more with 
honey than you do with vinegar. When people begin an interaction in 
an aggressive and offensive manner, most people want to deny them 
what they wish to obtain. On the other hand, when people begin in a 
courteous and cooperative manner, others feel guilty if they do not 
work to help them achieve what they need. 
When Professor Williams and I combined his previous study with 
one conducted years later by Professor Schneider, we concluded that 
many highly skilled negotiators are neither Cooperative/Problem-
Solvers nor Competitive/Adversarials—they are a hybrid. They 
combine the best traits from both categories by seeking highly 
beneficial results for their own sides, but they endeavor to 
accomplish this objective in a respectful and seemingly cooperative 
manner.
44
 These Competitive/Problem Solvers seek good results for 
themselves but then work to maximize opponent returns. Ron Shapiro 
and Mark Jankowski consider such persons to be “WIN-win” 
negotiators—“big win for your side, little win for theirs.”45 These 
bargainers appreciate the importance of the negotiation process. 
 
 42. GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 41 (1983). 
 43. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on 
the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 189 (2002). 
 44. See GERALD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES B. CRAVER, LEGAL NEGOTIATING 64–65 
(2007). See also ROGER DAWSON, SECRETS OF POWER NEGOTIATING 102–03 (3d ed. 2011) 
(describing the respectful façade and small concessions certain competitive “power negotiators” 
implement to great effect). 
 45. RONALD M. SHAPIRO & MARK A. JANKOWSKI, THE POWER OF NICE 5 (John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. rev. ed. 2001). 
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Individuals who feel the process has been fair and that they have been 
treated respectfully are more satisfied with objectively less beneficial 
terms than those who have not been treated respectfully.
46
 
In his insightful book Give and Take, Adam Grant carefully 
distinguishes between “givers” and “takers.”47 Although many 
persons might believe that takers, who like to claim value for 
themselves, would be the most successful negotiators, he 
demonstrates why givers tend to do better. Takers are openly selfish, 
causing opponents to be suspicious and careful not to give them too 
much. Givers endeavor to assist others, and induce those persons to 
reciprocate their generosity. Nonetheless, “selfless givers,” who 
simply work to satisfy the needs of others without seeking reciprocity 
for themselves, tend to do poorly, because they give others far more 
than they get in return. “Otherish givers” work to advance the 
interests of others but simultaneously strive to enhance their own 
gains.
48
 These proficient bargainers are similar to 
Competitive/Problem Solvers, who work to maximize opponent 
gains—but only after they have obtained what they really want for 
their own side. 
VI. PREPARING THOROUGHLY FOR TRANSNATIONAL INTERACTIONS 
Before American government representatives, lawyers, and 
businesspersons commence bargaining interactions with people from 
different countries, they should carefully prepare for those 
encounters. After they have gathered the pertinent economic, legal, 
and business information, determined their own bottom lines and 
aspiration levels, and estimated the bottom lines and interests of the 
opposing parties, they should take some time to learn about the 
cultures of their adversaries.
49
 They should explore the national 
histories and cultural practices of those persons. Foreigners 
frequently criticize Americans for ignoring such factors. They 
assume Americans arrogantly believe these topics are irrelevant. 
 
 46. See generally Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Just Negotiation, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 
381 (2010). 
 47. See ADAM GRANT, GIVE AND TAKE 155–85 (2013). 
 48. See HARVARD BUSINESS ESSENTIALS, NEGOTIATION 73 (2003). 
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When Americans demonstrate both an understanding of and respect 
for the histories of other nations and for the diverse cultures 
associated with those countries, they enhance the probability 
bargaining interactions will begin beneficially. 
Most individuals are very proud of and affected by the historical 
developments of their own countries.
50
 Do they have a history of 
unbridled capitalism, limited capitalism, socialism, communism, or 
other system? Is their economic system subject to minimal or 
expansive government regulation? Is their government democratic, 
autocratic, plutocratic, or monarchical? Is their government relatively 
stable or unstable? Has their nation been invaded by people from 
other countries, and have they been occupied by foreign powers? 
Persons from nations that have been invaded by major powers, 
especially those that have been occupied by such parties, tend to be 
suspicious of seeming economic invaders. American business 
negotiators should let people from such countries know they plan to 
create mutually beneficial relationships that will not detract from the 
autonomy of those parties. 
American firm representatives should ascertain how foreign 
companies operate.
51
 Do top executives make final decisions on their 
own, or must they consult with board members or subordinate 
groups? Do a minimal number of persons have to be convinced 
before deals become final, or must a substantial number of 
individuals give their approval? If many individuals have to give their 
approval, who are they and how may American negotiators 
communicate with them? When group decision making is required, it 
will take longer for a consensus to be achieved, and American 
representatives must be patient and allow the deciding persons the 
time they need to conclude the interaction. 
United States corporate agents must appreciate the different ways 
companies from different countries treat their employees. In America, 
private employers can usually terminate or lay off workers for good 
cause, bad cause, or no cause, under the “employment-at-will” 
 
 50. See id. at 117–25. 
 51. See ENGLISH, supra note 22, at 225. 
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doctrine.
52
 Only when large employers plan “mass layoffs” do they 
have to provide the affected workers with sixty-days advanced notice 
under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act 
(WARN).
53
 In most other industrial nations, firms cannot terminate or 
lay off employees without cause, and they may be required to provide 
such persons with severance pay. In countries like Japan, many 
corporations feel a moral obligation to retain employees, except when 
being forced to deal with extreme economic circumstances. Business 
leaders in such nations are amazed by the short-term viewpoints of 
American executives and their willingness to lay off workers 
whenever it seems economically beneficial. When U.S. agents 
endeavor to negotiate joint ventures with firms in these countries, 
they must appreciate these different philosophies before describing 
the arrangements they are contemplating. 
The U.S. government rarely gets significantly involved in the 
regulation of private business deals. As long as those arrangements 
do not raise issues under applicable statutes, such as antitrust laws, 
they do not require government approval. In other nations, however, 
government agencies may not only have to approve such deals but 
they may also be required to participate directly in the inter-firm 
negotiations.
54
 When such governmental participation is expected, the 
American negotiators must ascertain the interests that must be 
satisfied before formal approval can be achieved. The U.S. firm 
representatives must recognize that such government entities may not 
simply focus on business considerations but may also explore more 
expansive social, environmental, and even political interests. It is thus 
beneficial to retain local attorneys who are familiar with the 
applicable legal doctrines and the pertinent administrative 
requirements. If these areas are ignored, beneficial business 
arrangements may be thwarted or delayed. 
In some countries (e.g., China and India), gifts or gratuities may 
be given to government administrators, to encourage the expeditious 
processing of business deal approval requests. These are generally 
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not bribes. They are merely facilitation fees that are not intended to 
corruptly influence the recipients but merely to encourage them to 
provide faster processing. As a result, such facilitation payments do 
not come under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
55
 It is usually 
preferable to have such payments made by local agents who know the 
government officials involved and understand how such payments are 
to be made. 
The United States has a highly legalistic culture. When American 
firms interact with other companies, they endeavor to generate 
binding contractual relationships that are subject to judicial or arbitral 
enforcement. Each term is explicitly defined. Corporations from 
different cultures, such as China and Japan, are more relationship-
oriented. They seek to create long-term business partnerships based 
more on mutual trust and respect than on contractual obligations.
56
 
When bargaining parties initiate their discussions, they use the 
Preliminary Stage to establish rapport and set the tone for their 
interactions. In countries like the United States, this phase is 
relatively short, as the participants move expeditiously into the 
substantive discussions. When American business agents commence 
bargaining talks with individuals from countries like China and 
Japan, they must have a more expansive Preliminary Stage, to enable 
them to establish mutual relationships with their foreign counterparts. 
This may take several days, or even longer. 
Once the substantive discussions begin, the American negotiators 
should be careful not to be overly legalistic. If they seek unusually 
specific contractual language, their adversaries may think this 
evidences a lack of trust and respect for their companies. They prefer 
to develop agreements containing relatively general language. When 
future issues arise, instead of seeking resolution through adjudicative 
procedures, they expect to use the bargaining process to resolve such 
matters. This is why they consider long-term, trusting relationships to 
be so important.   
 
 55. See ACUFF, supra note 20, at 129. 
 56. See SALACUSE, GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR, supra note 14, at 96–97, 103.  
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VII. INITIATING TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL AND BUSINESS 
DISCUSSIONS DURING THE PRELIMINARY STAGE 
When individuals from different cultures commence bargaining 
interactions, it can be beneficial for them to employ a prolonged 
Preliminary Stage, to get to know each other and to establish positive 
relationships.
57
 The participants should take the time to explore their 
respective cultures and to begin to understand each side’s 
idiosyncrasies. During this phase, they should avoid real substantive 
discussions. Most Americans find this part of the process distasteful, 
because they are impatient and wish to get down to business quickly. 
They should appreciate the fact that negotiators who patiently 
establish affirmative relationships, based on mutual respect for each 
side’s different approaches to bargaining interactions, enhance the 
likelihood of generating successful deals. Individuals who rush this 
stage of the process and fail to create trusting relationships may either 
miss the opportunity to achieve mutual deals or obtain terms less 
efficient than the ones they might have achieved had they taken the 
time to establish mutual respect and trust with the opposing 
representatives. 
When American negotiators begin to interact with agents from 
less legalistic cultures, they should politely explain their need for 
certain contractual specificity but must also appreciate the lack of 
trust displayed by demands for total specificity. They must decide 
which terms should really be covered in detail and which ones may 
be more generally defined. Such an accommodation should 
significantly contribute to the likelihood of achieving mutual accords. 
When negotiators from different countries interact, language 
difficulties are likely to arise.
58
 Even though most transnational 
interactions involving Americans are conducted entirely or at least 
partially in English, misunderstandings may develop. Foreign agents 
may interpret verbal statements and nonverbal signals differently 
from their American counterparts.
59
 Some cultures process language 
in a highly “rational,” linear manner, while others do so in an 
 
 57. See ACUFF, supra note 20, at 77–79. 
 58. See, e.g., SALACUSE, GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR, supra note 14, at 94–96. 
 59. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 39, at 112–30. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 45:69 
 
 
indirect, emotional, and nonlinear fashion. American negotiators 
should speak clearly and more deliberately than they might at home, 
to be certain their messages are comprehended. They should avoid 
the use of slang expressions that may not be understood by persons 
who have not resided in the United States for prolonged periods. 
When opposing parties have confused looks on their faces or ask 
questions which indicate they are having difficulty understanding 
what has been said, the U.S. agents should patiently work to express 
themselves in ways more likely to be understood. 
On some occasions, transnational negotiations must be conducted 
through interpreters.
60
 When this is necessary, the U.S. participants 
should be sure to employ someone completely fluent in the foreign 
language. This significantly diminishes the risk of avoidable 
misunderstandings. American agents who are not truly fluent in a 
foreign language should not try to negotiate in that language. While it 
would be beneficial for such persons to greet their foreign 
counterparts in their native language, their efforts to converse in that 
language during the substantive discussions may create needless 
difficulties. 
VIII. VALUE CREATION DURING THE INFORMATION STAGE 
Once negotiators have established some degree of rapport and set 
the tone for their interaction, they enter the Information Stage, during 
which they must seek to determine the items they have to share with 
one another. Each side hopes to discern the primary objectives and 
underlying interests of the other side. Proficient bargainers begin to 
look for possible ways to expand the overall pie to be divided, 
recognizing that in most circumstances, the parties do not value the 
different terms identically and oppositely. The more successfully the 
participants are able to expand the pie, the more efficiently they 
should be able to structure mutual accords.
61
 
The most effective way to elicit information from opponents is to 
ask questions. During the initial portion of the Information Stage, 
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many persons make the mistake of asking narrow questions that can 
be answered with minimal replies. As a result, they merely confirm 
what they already suspect. It is more effective to begin with broad, 
open-ended, information-seeking questions, which induce opposing 
parties to talk. The more they say, the more they disclose. Only after 
they believe they have obtained a substantial amount of information 
through general inquiries should negotiators begin to narrow the 
focus of their questions to confirm what they think they have heard.
62
 
Once individuals have obtained a good deal of opposing party 
information, they should shift to “what” and “why” questions. The 
“what inquiries” are designed to ascertain the true objectives of the 
other side, while the “why inquiries” are used to probe the 
“underlying interests” reflected in those goals. Questioners should 
listen carefully for verbal leaks that inadvertently disclose critical 
information. For example, if someone says they are “not inclined” or 
“do not want” to do something, it generally suggests they are actually 
willing to do what is being discussed. They do not feel comfortable 
lying about their side’s true intentions, thus, they truthfully say that 
they are “not inclined” or “do not want” to do something. Listeners 
should appreciate that they will most likely move in the desired 
direction if given sufficient time. 
It is vital to appreciate the “underlying interests” of bargaining 
parties. It might not be possible to provide opponents with the 
specific terms they are seeking, but it may be possible to satisfy their 
underlying interests in another manner. Someone may be demanding 
more cash than this side can afford, but they might accept partial 
payment in goods or services which this side could provide. A 
country may not be willing to permit the United States to establish a 
military base exactly where it would like to put it, but may be willing 
to accept the base in another location that would be acceptable to the 
United States. When business partners have reached a difficult point 
in their relationship, it might be critical for one side to apologize to 
the other for something it should not have done. It is important to 
acknowledge that even major executives are human beings with 
emotional needs. So often, someone who feels they have been 
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04 (2d ed. 2007). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 45:69 
 
 
wronged by another really wants to hear that side say it is sorry for 
what has occurred. 
Should bargainers make the initial offer or seek to induce the 
other side to do so? Many people like to make the first offer, because 
they believe this will enable them to anchor the bargaining range. 
This approach may work when the negotiation range is well known 
by both sides, but it may put them at a disadvantage when the range 
is less certain. This is because it enables the opposing side to 
“bracket” their goal by beginning far enough away from this side’s 
opening position to place its target midpoint between the two opening 
offers. They hope to generate equal concessions that will enable them 
to end up exactly where they desire. In addition, if one side has 
miscalculated the actual value of the interaction, whoever goes first 
will disclose the error and place himself at a disadvantage. 
When there are a number of different items to be negotiated, as 
there usually are with respect to transnational interactions, the 
participants should endeavor to determine the degree to which each 
side values the various terms. Most bargainers begin the serious 
discussions focusing on either the most important terms or the least 
important terms. If someone begins with five items, four of which are 
important to this side, it can assume that all five are important to the 
other side. If they begin with five items, four of which are relatively 
insignificant to this side, most likely all five are unimportant to the 
opposing party. 
It is usually beneficial to begin the serious discussions with a 
focus on some of the less significant terms, to enable the participants 
to begin to reach tentative agreements on some items. When most 
experts interact, they initial the terms tentatively agreed upon 
(nothing is final until all of the terms have been resolved), and they 
reserve the right to revisit a prior item if that becomes necessary 
during subsequent talks. As bargaining parties tentatively resolve 20, 
40, and even 60 percent of the items in question, they become 
psychologically committed to overall agreements and become more 
flexible when they focus on the more significant terms. 
During the Information Stage, parties frequently over- and 
understate the value of particular items for strategic purposes. If Side 
A thinks Side B really hopes to get Item 1, which Side A does not 
particularly value, Side A may suggest Item 1 is important to it, to 
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make it seem like a significant concession when it gives that term to 
Side B. Side A may similarly understate the degree to which it values 
an item, if it believes Side B does not value that term, to enable it to 
obtain that item at minimal cost to its own side. Parties may similarly 
indicate that they cannot agree to something their side is actually 
willing to accept, to gain a bargaining advantage. Are such 
misrepresentations unethical? U.S. attorneys are governed by the 
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules, and Rule 4.1 
prohibits the knowing misrepresentation of “material law or fact to a 
third person.”63 Nonetheless, Comment 2 to Rule 4.1 explicitly 
indicates, “Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, 
certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of 
material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a 
transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a 
claim are ordinarily in this category . . . .”64  
Courts generally allow what is commonly called “puffing” and 
“embellishment” during bargaining interactions, so long as such 
misstatements merely pertain to subjective client values and 
settlement intentions.
65
 Similar behavior is accepted by negotiators in 
other countries. Nonetheless, if parties go further and misrepresent 
what opponents have the right to rely on, they subject their clients to 
possible fraud liability—and they seriously risk permanent damage to 
their professional reputations. It is extremely difficult to negotiate 
with persons you cannot trust. You have to verify everything they tell 
you, and you can never be certain they will carry out agreements 
achieved. 
  
IX. VALUE CLAIMING DURING THE DISTRIBUTIVE  
AND CLOSING STAGES 
 
Once negotiators are finished “creating value” during the 
Information Stage, they begin to “claim value” during the 
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OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 305–09 (2010).  
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Distributive Stage.
66
 This is an inherently competitive portion of 
bargaining interactions, as the participants determine how to divide 
the surplus they have created. The transition from the Information 
Stage to the Distributive Stage is usually clear, as the participants 
cease asking each other what they want and begin to talk about what 
they hope to achieve for their own side. Negotiators should plan their 
concession patterns carefully, to enable them to articulate principled 
explanations for all of their position changes. They should generally 
make each position change smaller than the previous changes, and 
they should avoid consecutive concessions that are not reciprocated 
by opposing side position changes. Participants should always be 
aware of their current non-settlement options, and appreciate the fact 
that a bad deal is almost always worse than no deal. When it is clear 
that what the other side is offering is not as beneficial as their non-
settlement alternatives, they should politely indicate their willingness 
to walk away. Once the other side appreciates that they are willing to 
end the interaction, it will almost always put a more generous offer 
on the bargaining table, enabling the talks to continue. 
During the Distributive Stage, participants employ various 
techniques to advance their interests. They regularly employ legal, 
economic, political, and even emotional arguments to further their 
goals. These assertions should be presented in a seemingly objective 
and even-handed manner, if they are to appeal to others. Individuals 
frequently articulate negative threats indicating the adverse 
consequences that will affect the other side if it does not give in to 
this side’s demands. Skilled negotiators often substitute affirmative 
promises that are actually more likely to generate opponent position 
changes. Instead of threatening negative action unless opponents give 
in, they promise to reciprocate position changes made by the other 
side. This provides opposing parties with face-saving ways to make 
concessions. 
Silence and patience are critical during the Distributive Stage. 
When someone makes a concession, he should remain silent awaiting 
 
 66. See generally Charles B. Craver, The Inherent Tension Between Value Creation and 
Value Claiming during Bargaining Interactions, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 14 (2010) 
(encouraging parties not to puff and embellish too much during the Information Stage, and to 
avoid inefficient item exchanges during the Distributive and Closing Stages). 
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the other side’s response. If he continues to talk, he tends to give up 
important information, and may even bid against himself by making 
additional position changes that are not reciprocated by the opposing 
side. For example, a prospective firm buyer may initially offer to pay 
the seller $45,000,000, and then suggest $48,000,000 when the other 
side says nothing in response to this party’s opening offer. Such a 
quick and unreciprocated position change would indicate the buyer is 
willing to go over $50,000,000, if necessary, to conclude the deal. It 
takes time for persons to decide to change their existing positions, 
and good bargainers are careful to provide others with the time they 
need to realize the need for concessions. During this part of the 
interactions, participants should always monitor the concession 
patterns of both sides, to be sure they are not making excessive or 
unreciprocated position changes. 
Near the end of the Distributive Stage, the participants begin to 
appreciate that an agreement is likely to be achieved, and they enter 
an especially delicate part of the interaction—the Closing Stage. By 
the time they have gotten this far, the participants have made a great 
deal of progress, and they have become psychologically committed to 
a deal. Many less skilled negotiators move too quickly to conclude 
the interaction, and they close 60, 70, or even 80 percent of the 
remaining gap. For example, the individuals in our hypothetical buy-
sell interaction may be $5,000,000 apart when they begin to 
appreciate that a deal is likely to be consummated. The more anxious 
buyer may end up paying $3,000,000—or even $4,000,000—more, to 
be sure the deal is finalized. This is why it is critical for negotiators to 
continue to move slowly and patiently during this part of their 
interactions. They must appreciate that by this stage, both sides wish 
to achieve accords. They should thus be sure to move slowly with the 
other party toward the final terms, and avoid excessive position 
changes by their side. If they can exude exceptional patience, they 
can frequently induce anxious opposing parties to close most of the 
gap remaining between them. 
X. VALUE MAXIMIZING THROUGH THE COOPERATIVE STAGE 
Once a tentative agreement has been achieved through the 
distributive process, many negotiators erroneously believe the 
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bargaining process is finished. This is almost never true with respect 
to multiple-item transnational accords. During the prior stages, the 
participants have over- and understated the value of different terms 
for strategic purposes, and various items may have ended up on the 
inefficient side of the table.
67
 I demonstrate this to my negotiation 
class students by assigning specific point values to each item to be 
negotiated. If one term is worth 100 points to one side but only 40 
points to the other side, it should usually end up on the side valuing it 
more highly. If it is on the side valuing it at 40 points, that side 
should offer to trade it for something it values at more than 40 
points—and for which the other side values for less than 100 points. 
Such trades enable the participants to expand the overall surplus and 
simultaneously improve their respective returns. They should 
continue this process until neither can gain more without the other 
side losing something. 
When a party decides to move into the Cooperative Stage, it is 
critical the other side realizes they are making this transition. The 
moving party should initially acknowledge a tentative accord has 
been reached and suggest the exploration of possible areas for mutual 
gain. If someone moves into the Cooperative Stage without an 
understanding of the opposing side, and suggests modifications that 
are all worse than what has already been achieved, the other side may 
think the moving party is being dishonest and trying to take things 
away from the other side. This might cause the entire deal to unravel. 
Both sides must appreciate the movement into the Cooperative Stage, 
to enable them to jointly explore possible ways to improve their 
respective situations. If none of the offered trades are mutually 
beneficial, the parties have most likely generated efficient terms that 
cannot be improved. 
Once transnational agreements are achieved, the parties must 
determine whether the specific terms will be expressed in English or 
the language of the other country. This issue can be critical when 
future disagreements arise, because language differences may be 
outcome determinative. In many cases, the parties may develop 
official texts in both languages, and specify that mediators and 
 
 67. Id. at 15–17. 
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arbitrators who may subsequently be employed to help the parties 
resolve contractual disagreements be fluent in both languages. 
Most American and foreign businesspersons do not like to subject 
their corporations to foreign laws or to the jurisdiction of foreign 
courts. They fear local biases will place them at a disadvantage. It is 
thus common for negotiators to establish their own procedures to 
resolve such controversies.
68
 They usually provide for inter-party 
negotiations. When such efforts do not produce the desired results, 
they often designate neutral persons to serve as mediators. If they are 
unable to resolve the issues through such procedures, they usually 
require the disputing parties submit the matter to arbitration. They 
may specify that the arbitration process conform to the dictates of 
entities like the International Chamber of Commerce, the London 
Court of Arbitration, or the American Arbitration Association. Such 
procedures enable parties to resolve temporary disagreements in a 
relatively amicable manner, which allows them to preserve their 
underlying business relationships. Since neither side is usually 
willing to subject their firms to the legal doctrines of other nations, 
their transnational agreements generally tell arbitrators to apply the 
doctrines generally applied in the international arena to such business 
arrangements. 
XI. CELL PHONE AND E-MAIL INTERACTIONS 
Many transnational negotiations are conducted by way of cell 
phone discussions and e-mail exchanges, due to the substantial 
physical distances between bargaining parties. These interactions 
involve the same stages and bargaining techniques as in-person 
interactions, but they consist of a series of shorter exchanges and 
preclude visual contact, except where video phones are available. 
Some persons treat such interactions less seriously than they would 
in-person discussions, which can be a major mistake. 
When someone contacts the cell phone of an opposing party, they 
may reach them at a bad time and/or in a poor location. They may be 
at an athletic event or in a tavern with friends, surrounded by many 
other people. They might be distracted by what is going on around 
 
 68. See SALACUSE, GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR, supra note 14, at 68–71. 
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them, and the conversation may be overheard by strangers who have 
no right to hear the confidential information being discussed. When 
call recipients answer their phones, the caller should ask if this is a 
good time to talk. If not, the caller should ask the call recipient to 
return the call when they are in a more isolated area where they can 
focus on the matter at hand. 
Telephone discussions are less personal than face-to-face 
interactions, making it easier for participants to employ overtly 
competitive tactics. It also makes it easier for persons to reject 
proposals being made by the other side. When very significant talks 
are involved, it may behoove the participants to schedule in-person 
discussions in a mutually acceptable location. If this is not possible, 
they might take advantage of video conferencing that enables both 
sides to see each other. 
Many persons think telephone conversations are less revealing 
than in-person talks because the participants cannot see each other. 
They act as if opposing parties cannot perceive their nonverbal 
signals during these interactions. This is incorrect; many people can 
perceive nonverbal signals more through telephone lines than in 
person, because they are listening intently to the voice. They can hear 
the pitch, pace, tone, inflection, and volume of the speaker. A 
prolonged pause may indicate a particular offer is being more 
carefully considered by a recipient who did not hesitate to reject prior 
proposals. A sigh in response to a new proposal may indicate the 
recipient of the new offer is confident an agreement will be achieved. 
The best readers of nonverbal signals I have seen are blind students, 
who are able to hear things in my voice that I cannot discern myself. 
Telephone negotiators should listen carefully for verbal leaks 
emanating from the other side. They should simultaneously be aware 
of their own verbal leaks and work hard to control the words they are 
speaking.  
It is usually advantageous to be the caller rather than the recipient 
of the call, because the caller has had the opportunity to prepare for 
the interaction.
69
 If they are caught off guard and do not recall where 
the parties were when they last spoke several weeks ago, call 
 
 69. See GEORGE ROSS, TRUMP STYLE NEGOTIATION 212 (2006). 
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recipients may make the first concession during this interaction, even 
though they made the last position change during the prior talks. If 
someone receives a phone call and is not well prepared to negotiate, 
he should indicate he is busy and will return the call. He should take 
out the file to review previous developments and then call back the 
other party, fully prepared to bargain. 
A significant number of individuals like to conduct their 
negotiations primarily through e-mail exchanges, especially younger 
persons, who have grown up using e-mail, text messaging, and 
similar electronic means of communication. Most people who 
endeavor to limit their bargaining communications to e-mail 
exchanges are not comfortable with the traditional negotiation 
process. They do not like the amorphous nature of that process and 
the split-second tactical decision making that must occur during in-
person interactions. They forget bargaining involves uniquely 
personal encounters not easily conducted entirely through written 
communications.
70
 
Individuals contemplating bargaining interactions conducted 
primarily through e-mail should appreciate how difficult it is to 
establish rapport with opposing parties through such lean written 
mediums that lack facial expressions and general body language.
71
 It 
is thus beneficial to initially telephone opponents to exchange some 
personal information and to establish minimal relationships.
72
 People 
who first create mutual relationships through such oral exchanges are 
likely to find their subsequent negotiations more pleasant and more 
efficient. They are also more likely to generate more cooperative 
behavior, more trusting relationships, and more efficient 
agreements.
73
 If telephone exchanges would be difficult, especially 
where very different language capabilities are involved, it would be 
 
 70. See generally Leigh Thompson & Janice Nadler, Negotiating Via Information 
Technology: Theory and Application, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 109 (2002) (describing the unique 
advantages and disadvantages of e-communication, and concluding e-communication usually 
fails to involve the same amount of information exchange gleaned from face-to-face 
negotiations). 
 71. Id. at 111. 
 72. See id. at 121; Janice Nadler, Rapport in Legal Negotiation: How Small Talk Can 
Facilitate E-Mail Dealmaking, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 223, 237 (2004). 
 73. See Thompson & Nadler, supra note 70, at 111. 
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beneficial during early e-mail exchanges to disclose some personal 
information designed to enhance the rapport between the parties. 
E-mail proposals are often misinterpreted due to the “attribution 
bias.” As recipients evaluate proposals sent by opponents, they 
frequently read more or less into the stated terms than what was 
actually intended, because they tend to assume the senders are being 
manipulative. Their misinterpretations may be compounded by their 
escalated replies, which may further exacerbate the situation. This 
explains why e-mail negotiations tend to be less cooperative than in-
person interactions.
74
 When persons become especially frustrated by 
unpleasant e-mail exchanges, they may decide to write highly 
negative replies. It may make them feel better to prepare such 
responses, so long as they remember to click “cancel” instead of 
“send” when they are done. 
When parties send documents to others in electronic form, they 
usually inadvertently include critical information that is not obvious 
on the face of those documents—and which they do not intend to 
share with the recipients.
75
 Every keystroke, deletion, and addition is 
recorded in the electronic metadata associated with Word files. 
Recipients who know how to “mine” electronic files for hidden 
information may be able to determine exactly how documents were 
prepared and edited, and even uncover editorial comments made by 
persons who reviewed earlier drafts. Negotiators should use 
reasonable care when transmitting electronic documents, to prevent 
the disclosure of metadata containing confidential information. They 
can employ one of several scrubbing software programs designed to 
eliminate such metadata from files before they are shared with others. 
If they are working in recent versions of Word, they can visit 
Microsoft’s Office website,76 which explains how to remove 
unwanted metadata from Word files. They can alternatively publish 
 
 74. See Kathleen L. McGinn & Rachel Corson, What Do Communication Media Mean for 
Negotiators? A Question of Social Awareness, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND 
CULTURE 334, 341 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004). 
 75. See, e.g., Craver, Negotiation Ethics for Real World Interactions, supra note 65, at 
329–30. 
 76. See Remove Hidden Data and Personal Information from Office Documents, OFFICE,  
http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/excel-help/remove-hidden-data-and-personal-information-
from-office-documents-HA010037593.aspx?CTT=1 (last visited Apr. 12, 2014). 
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to PDF and send the document in that format, which does not contain 
unwanted information. 
XII. CONCLUSION  
Communication and transportation advances have created a 
global, political, and economic world involving increased 
transnational inter-government and private business interactions. 
Nations interact with each other through formal channels (Type I 
Diplomacy) and through seemingly non-governmental entities (Type 
II Diplomacy). U.S. corporations do business with firms around the 
world. All of these transnational interactions are significantly 
influenced by cultural differences. Due to the greater complexity of 
transnational bargaining compared with wholly domestic interactions, 
parties must prepare more carefully for such discussions, and use 
extended Preliminary Stages to establish rapport and positive tones 
for their interactions. They must use the Information Stage to avoid 
the disclosure of information they do not wish to share with opposing 
parties, to identify the basic issues and underlying interests, and to 
create joint surpluses; and they must use the Distributive and Closing 
Stages to divide those items between themselves. Finally, the 
Cooperative Stage should be employed to generate mutually efficient 
accords. Individuals must carefully conduct bargaining interactions 
through cell phone talks and e-mail exchanges. 
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